

Strategy Research Project

AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH TO GRAND STRATEGY

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CRAIG A. BARKLEY
United States Army

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U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH TO GRAND STRATEGY

by

Lieutenant Colonel Craig A. Barkley
United States Army

Colonel Gregory M. Martin
Project Adviser

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

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The nation requires reform to the antiquated processes for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of United States grand strategy. Both current and future administrations of the United States must deal with many new and emerging challenges not considered threats during the Cold War. Current threats and opportunities are more diffuse and ambiguous than in the past. This new environment necessitates the United States pursue a comprehensive or whole of government approach to the development and implementation of strategy to ensure a unity of action and synergy to meet the national objectives and goals. This requires a reexamination of its current approaches to the development of grand strategy and implementation. This paper will examine and analyze options to achieve a national whole of government approach to both development and implementation of U.S. grand strategy to ensure the nation approaches its national objectives and interests in a coordinated and synergistic method.

AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH TO GRAND STRATEGY

The development and implementation of U.S. grand strategy requires institutional reforms to create a synergistic whole of government approach to meet the challenges of the 21st century, achieve national objectives and secure United States national interests. The current national security apparatus was developed following World War II. The international environment is very different from the Cold War and the one that emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States is a great nation and, as it has in the past, must reinvent itself to prepare for the challenges ahead both for national security and for effective government in general.¹ National security policy is the most important area of policy for a nation; all others support the goals and objectives for the nation's security. It is crucial to the survivability of the nation and the preservation of the nation's core values. For this reason, the nation requires reform to the antiquated processes for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of United States Grand Strategy.

To begin to understand the need for reform, a common definition for Grand Strategy is required. B.H. Liddell Hart described the role of grand strategy as follows:

For the role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.²

Although this definition focuses primarily on war, an expansion could include the nation's capabilities to prevent war through statecraft to meet national policy objectives. Collin Gray defines grand strategy as "the purposeful employment of all of the assets of the state, not only to use the military instrument."³ An effective grand strategy, therefore, necessitates an integrated approach that includes the ways, of the nation's capabilities;

its means to achieve the national objectives; and the ends or purposes. Hence, a common definition for grand strategy is the plan that integrates the capabilities of the departments within the United States government to achieve the national policy objectives.

How should an integrated, interagency approach be adopted to design U.S. grand strategy? Who are the crafters of this holistic approach? Is there a governmental agency or a single leader that prepares this grand strategy? Once the strategy is developed, how is the implementation plan developed that will allow the nation to achieve its goals and protect its national interests? Who deconflicts these vertical stove piped approaches to achieving national security objectives? In addition, in what forum do they act? These are just of few of the questions that the administration must answer in order to develop a “results-oriented” national grand strategy that provide the ends, ways, and mean to accomplish its objectives.

While the President is the ultimate arbiter and decision maker, he cannot develop grand strategy on his own. This would be a daunting task for even the greatest leader. Under the current national security system, there is no formal entity ensuring the efforts of the departments are complimentary and working toward common objectives except for the President.⁴ Leadership is important, but no matter how capable a leader, the weakness of the current system hinders his ability to adapt to the frequency of changes that impact national security.⁵

The Project on National Security Reform in its report stated that the national security of the United States is at risk.⁶ Ineffective government processes lead to cross efforts within the United States national security apparatus leading to confusion and

distrust from our friends, allies, and even our adversaries. Efficient and effective interagency coordination is critical to the nation's continued status as a world superpower and continued ability to lead the world. Therefore, the national security apparatus requires reform to both better inform the leadership and provide greater interagency coordination to meet future challenges and ensure the viability of the nation's security.

The Department of Defense experienced a similar challenge prior to the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. The Goldwater-Nichols Act provided the impetus for the U.S. Military services to work together improving both their coordination and interdependence. Although it has taken time for the services to integrate into a mindset of "Jointness", many of the field grade and below could not imagine a world without the integration of our sister services.

This paper examines why we need a national whole of government approach to both development and implementation of U.S. grand strategy and proposes options for this approach to ensure the nation approaches its national objectives and interests in a coordinated and synergistic method.

Why Reform is Needed

The international environment has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the Second World War, U.S. grand strategy focused primarily on the containment of communism. Departments or agencies could handle many of these challenges sequentially, but when a contingency required the simultaneous use of military, diplomatic, and other U.S. capabilities, the outcome was suboptimal or even disastrous.⁷ Ambassador Robert E. Hunter, Ambassador to NATO 1993-1998, sums up the strategy in his testimony to the Armed Services Committee.

US grand strategy during that era was direct, clear, and simple. It was dominated by three basic propositions: to contain the Soviet Union, its allies and its acolytes; to confound communism; and – both to help achieve those twin goals and for its own value -- to lead a growing, global free-world economy.⁸

The national security system in operation since 1947 was the result of “a singular, unambiguous threat and its constitutional order” focused primarily on the military instrument of power.⁹ The current and future administrations of the United States must deal with many new and emerging challenges not considered threats during the Cold War. Current threats and opportunities are “diffuse, ambiguous, and express themselves in a multitude of forms.”¹⁰ This new international environment poses both threats and opportunities to U.S. national security requiring the disparate departments and agencies to coordinate a comprehensive strategy and plan. Therefore, in light of this new environment, the United States must pursue a comprehensive whole of government approach to the development and implementation of strategy to ensure a unity of action and synergy to meet the national objectives and goals. This requires a reexamination of its current approaches to the development of grand strategy and implementation.

As the United States begins to search for ways to reduce the national debt and improve the economic crisis, the nation will demand that the federal government find efficiencies in order to lower expenditures and produce cost savings. Through new improvements and efficiencies in the national security system, the United States will have the capability to remain an effective superpower for now and the future.

The 2010 National Security Strategy provided a framework and presidential direction to begin a whole of government approach. By combining the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council, it initiated the effort to increase efficiencies

at the highest levels by of the government.¹¹ In addition, the administration identified areas that present a challenge to the whole of government approach.

We are improving the integration of skills and capabilities within our military and civilian institutions, so they complement each other and operate seamlessly. We are also improving coordinated planning and policymaking and must build our capacity in key areas where we fall short. This requires close cooperation with Congress and a deliberate and inclusive interagency process, so that we achieve integration of our efforts to implement and monitor operations, policies, and strategies.¹²

The NSS concludes by stating the executive branch must leverage the capabilities of all departments and agencies through collaboration with the interagency, intergovernmental, and industry.¹³ In addition, to create and implement a “results-oriented” national strategy requires cooperation and active consultation with legislative and judicial branches of government.¹⁴

Although the 2010 National Security Strategy discusses the need for a whole of government approach, it only states that the departments should coordinate and collaborate. It does not provide the ways or means to implement this desired approach.

Currently, multiple departmental and functional strategies and reviews attempt to support the National Security Strategy. However, many of these strategic documents were developed and published prior to the 2010 NSS and only allude to coordination with other departments in their development. These documents focus on their individual department’s roles and responsibilities not necessarily on an overarching U.S. strategy or plan.

Departments and agencies developed strategies and plans that are not coordinated or synergized with other departments. The Department of State published the Strategic Plan and more recently, it produced the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR).¹⁵ Combatant Commands, within the Department of

Defense, developed theater strategies and theater campaign plans for their assigned areas of operation. Although other U.S. government departments may be contacted or consulted with during the development of these strategic documents, they are usually only an after thought prior to publication. This leads to inefficiencies and at times even conflicting efforts to meeting national objectives. This may be the result of an inability to coordinate, insufficient authority, or lack of desire in order to maintain their respective budgets and interests. This alone is reason to develop a national grand strategy that includes ends, ways, means that focuses the departments and agencies within the United States government toward the policy objectives.

Leading national security experts in the United States, to include members of Congress, academia, think tanks, and the federal government, generally agree that the United States' failure to "integrate diplomatic, military, economic, and other elements of national power, primarily because its various national security organizations are not well incentivized."¹⁶ Secretary of Defense Gates has spoken out on several occasions for the need for reform and resourcing all instruments of national power. In a speech given at Kansas State University in 2007 he stated, "America's national security apparatus...needs to be more adept in operating along a continuum involving military, political, and economic skills... Bureaucratic barriers that hamper effective action should be rethought and reformed. The disparate strands of our national security apparatus, civilian and military, should be prepared ahead of time to deploy and operate together."¹⁷ In the Quadrennial Defense Review 2010, he advocates for an "improved interagency strategic planning process that makes optimal use of all national instruments of statecraft."¹⁸

In addition, Congress has weighed in to take action to improve underlying challenges to interagency coordination. In September 2010, Representative Ike Skelton introduced legislation in to create a system for interagency education, training, and experience similar to the Joint Qualification System for the Department of Defense in the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986.¹⁹ This bill stated that the modern national security challenges are complex and dynamic and require integration of the full spectrum of capabilities and power of the United States.²⁰ The current “agency-centric” cultures, incentives, and structures inherent in the national security system prevent full and effective interagency cooperation and coordination causing the United States to be vulnerable to the complex and dynamic modern nation security threats.²¹ Therefore, the bill states that it is imperative to the nation’s security that national security professionals are provided with interagency knowledge, skills, and experience to effectively integrate and utilize the full capabilities and power of the United States.²² This is a first step toward developing cultural understanding and future coordination in the interagency. However, this is only one aspect of the problem.

The solution requires a more holistic reform of the national security system to ensure the policy objectives are a coordinated effort of all the nation’s capabilities. Reform will require more than education and training to bring the interagency together. It will necessitate both the executive and legislative branches to work together to achieve holistic reform and improvements. As the 9/11 Commission stated, “Americans should not settle for incremental, ad hoc adjustments to a system designed generations ago for a world that no longer exists.”²³

Historical Background

Although decisions concerning national security have been made since the independence of the United States, the foundation of the current system was mandated through the passing of the National Security Act of 1947.²⁴ This system was not formed by a President or even from within the Executive Branch but was the result of Congressional legislation requiring a formal national security apparatus.²⁵ The impetus for Congress passing legislation to reform the organization of the national security apparatus was partly to prevent another surprise attack like the one conducted at Pearl Harbor and integration problems during World War II.²⁶ Congress believed that by establishing formal interagency consultative structures, both intelligence and policy would be better coordinated within the Executive Branch.²⁷ The National Security Act of 1947 purpose is the following:

...it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security²⁸

The National Security Council was mandated as a forcing function for integration and coordination between the departments and agencies within the United States Government. Congress intended to both aid and restrain the president in foreign policy development and implementation.²⁹

Although President Truman supported the creation of an advisory group, he was “resistant to any organization with decision making or operational authority within the Executive Branch.”³⁰ It was not until the outbreak of the Korean War that he participated and began using the National Security Council to develop, discuss, and coordinate policy.³¹

The national security system has evolved since its inception in 1947. Most reforms within the government were the result of some event or challenge that the national leadership wanted to prevent in the future. While Presidents have initiated numerous adjustments to the system, through presidential directives or executive orders, Congress has offered only one legislative change, the 1949 Amendments to the 1947 National Security Act.

As early as 1949, the Amendments to the National Security Act adopted the recommendations of the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, also known as the Hoover Commission, for increasing the secretary of defense's authority, through the establishment of the Department of Defense, and improving teamwork throughout the National Security Organization.³²

The Truman Administration resisted this directed reform initially, but over time, the elements of this legislation became advantageous to the conduct of the national security system. In addition, the National Security Council has evolved to conform to the needs and leadership styles of each president.³³ Each President tends to recreate and reinvent the National Security Council system as he chooses.³⁴ More recently, presidents have attempted to increase coordination within the interagency to improve the whole of government approach to foreign policy and strategy formulation.

In 1997, President Clinton published Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), *Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*. The intent was to establish management practices to achieve unity of effort within the interagency.³⁵ PDD-56 was used to improve integration of strategy development and planning for Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and other operations.³⁶ PDD-56 required a political-military implementation

plan and a rehearsal/review of the plan to ensure integration of U.S. Government actions in complex contingency operations.³⁷

The administration of President George W. Bush drafted its own presidential guidance that captured many of the lessons learned from the 1990's; however, the document was not published until December of 2005 as National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. This deficiency in applying the lessons learned from the 1990s to inform the initial planning and conduct of the operations in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom resulted in a wanting integrated whole of government strategy for post-conflict operations.³⁸

NSPD-44 identified the Secretary of State as the lead for integrating the U.S. efforts for the conduct of stabilization and reconstruction activities. It required the integration of reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.³⁹ Although this NSPD defined responsibilities for the Department of State and other departments and agencies within the U.S. government, its effectiveness was dependent on cooperation and a willingness to share each department's limited resources for the good of the nation.

Current National Security System

President Obama began his presidency by publishing Presidential Policy Directive –1 (PPD-1), *Organization of the National Security Council System*. PPD-1 provides the framework for President's approach to national security policy formulation and implementation. As the principal forum for national security policy issues requiring Presidential consideration, the National Security Council (NSC) is tasked to advise and assist the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy – domestic,

foreign, military, intelligence, and economic.⁴⁰ The NSC, along with its subordinate committees-Principals, Deputies, and Interagency Policy Committees, are the principal means for coordinating executive branch in the development and implementation of national security policy.⁴¹ President Obama's PPD-1 offers a more inclusive membership than the previous Bush organization. It adds the Secretaries of Energy and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Representative of the U.S. to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President, and the Chief of Staff to the President.⁴² The Joint Staff represents the Combatant Commanders in the National Security System at the Interagency Policy Committee level.

The President integrated the White House staff supporting the homeland security and the national security creating a National Security Staff, but retained the official statutory Homeland and National Security Councils.⁴³ This was a step in the right direction for eliminating stove piped organizations and duplicate staffing.

In addition to changes in membership of the NSC, the National Security Advisor, General (Ret) Jones, revamped the way the NSC and subordinate committees would operate. In "The 21st Century Interagency Process" memorandum, he lays out principles for an interagency process that is strategic, agile, transparent, and predictable that advances the nation's security interests and then monitors the strategic implementation of the policy.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, two years later, has there really been a change?

Outside the Beltway, other organizations, to include combatant commanders and U.S. chiefs of mission stationed abroad, must develop and implement both strategy and plans in support of Washington's policy. A coordinated effort is required to ensure

efficiencies in the interagency process to prevent departments and agencies from working at cross-purposes globally, regionally, or in individual countries. The coordination of U.S. capabilities outside the borders of the United States encounters many challenges to both planning and execution.

The Department of Defense has both geographical and functional combatant commanders within the Department of Defense. There are six Geographical Combatant Commands and four Functional Combatant Commands. The Unified Command Plan assigns each of the geographical Combatant Commands an area of operations and regional responsibilities and the functional commands are assigned global responsibilities. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group, JIACG, is composed of U.S. Government civilian and military experts that provide the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments complementing the interagency coordination at the National Security Council system level.⁴⁵




Figure 1. DOS and DOD Area of Responsibility⁴⁶

The Department of State has individual chiefs of mission and supporting country teams with six regional bureaus, but the boundaries do not mirror those of the Department of Defense's Combatant Commands.⁴⁷ See Figure 1.

The lack of similar boundaries presents a major challenge to both the Department of State and the Department of Defense for coordination and planning to develop a whole of government approach to achieving national objectives. Within one combatant commander's area of responsibility, he must coordinate with three Regional Assistant Secretaries of State and 27 Country Teams.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs must coordinate with three

combatant commanders: U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM).⁴⁹ This requires considerable time to coordinate with the disparate entities of just two of the departments within the U.S. Government, in addition to coordinating with other departments, agencies, and the individual states.

There has been progress in the pursuit of interagency coordination. In 2004, Congress and Secretary Powell designed the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to develop and implement whole-of-government approach to the challenges of reconstruction and stabilization.⁵⁰ This capability is an interagency staff designed to “execute this mission” with personnel detailed from USAID, the Departments of Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce, Agriculture, and Homeland Security.⁵¹ This was another single aspect approach to creating a whole of government approach to Grand Strategy development and implementation.

Recommendations for Reform

Although the current National Security apparatus met the challenges of the past, reform is required to ensure a coordinated approach to future national challenges and to achieve the nation’s security objectives. The nation could continue the status quo, but to continue to work within the current framework does not provide optimal coordination and synchronization between the departments and agencies within the United States Government to meet the challenges of the current and future international environment. Therefore, this paper proposes several options to reform the interagency process to improve coordination as the nation pursues its grand strategy.

The Executive Branch engagement in daily operations and crisis management, it is improbable that it will have time to focus on internal reform.⁵² Even with strong

presidential leadership, the use of presidential directives is inadequate to force the departments to accept and implement the necessary reform.⁵³ While the executive branch may have the intent to implement a whole of government approach, it is unlikely it will be able to implement true reform without legislation and oversight from Congress to last between administrations. Congress must appropriate the funding for the personnel and resources needed to implement true transformation and reform.

Even with the lack of synergy and coordination in Operation Desert One, the failed rescue attempt of the Iranian hostages, and Operation Urgent Fury, the invasion of Grenada, Pentagon officials were reluctant for reform in the armed forces. It required Congress to pass legislation in the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to move the military toward jointness. Although there are still challenges to a fully integrated armed force, the reforms were successful in producing a “joint military with a high degree of interoperability, unity of effort, and a common culture of cooperation.”⁵⁴ The interagency requires similar reforms and legislative oversight.

The national security strategy provides many overarching policy objectives based on United States core values, but lacks a true strategy consisting of ends, ways, and means to accomplish its goals. This deficiency of a comprehensive approach to obtaining the goals outlined in the NSS leaves individual departments and agencies to interpret strategic guidance and develop separate strategies and plans in the attempt to meet the presidential intent.

The national security apparatus must conduct a “Quadrennial National Security Review” (QNSR) to develop U.S. national security strategy that identifies the objectives, the approach, and to determine the capabilities required to implement the strategy.⁵⁵

This includes a comprehensive assessment of the nation's core values and national interests. This review is essential to identifying national goals and objectives for the United States to meet the challenges of the future. This would provide the framework for a national whole of government approach to addressing the future.

It is crucial for the interagency to address the root causes of both the challenges and opportunities within the future international environment. This requires an “integrated, interagency framework for preventing and responding to crisis and conflict that marshals all the civilian capabilities of the U.S. government.”⁵⁶ In addition, the interagency response must be better coordinated with the military response: when the military is actively engaged in terminating conflict as well as when the mission transitions to civilian leadership.⁵⁷

To achieve a truly integrated approach to responding to crisis, the United States government must develop a national response system to respond to crises around the globe. The National Incident Management System used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency provides the initial structure to create what the Department of State terms the “International Operational Response Framework (IORF).”⁵⁸ This would provide the governance architecture for how the departments and agencies conduct crisis response addressing coordination among agencies, ensuring flexibility and speed in our response, and providing staffing to meet urgent needs- all leading to greater synergy between the organizations of the interagency.⁵⁹

The second opportunity for improved interagency coordination is to increase the roles and responsibilities of the National Security Council system and staff. The current National Security Council system provides the forums for interagency policy

coordination within the Beltway, but lacks the directed coordinating effort for the implementation of the policy through integrated strategies and plans. Congress would need to pass legislation to reform the current National Security Act providing greater responsibility for implementation within the national security staff.

This option invests greater implementation authority and oversight in the White House staff. The National Security Council must be the lead in coordinating policy planning and overseeing policy execution of global and regional crises that affect U.S. National Interests.⁶⁰ The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase I report stated, “The weaknesses of other U.S. federal government agencies have forced DoD to bear the main burden of nation-building. To redress this situation, civilian capacities for conducting complex contingency operations clearly need to be enhanced.”⁶¹

The Hart Rudman Commission recommended that the President guide a top-down strategic planning process delegating authority to the national security advisor to coordinate and synchronize the process at the national level.⁶² The President would retain the responsibility and authority for decision-making, but establishing an office within the National Security Council to integrate department and agency strategies and plans and ensure unity of effort and action within the government during execution.⁶³ This office would serve to ensure the nation is working toward a true grand strategic approach to national security.

In addition, other departments and agencies with the national security apparatus must establish planning offices to lead the development of their departmental plans and participate in the interagency planning process.⁶⁴

A third option for improvement in interagency coordination is to reform the regional organizational structures fully integrating national security departmental and agency expertise into a consolidated regional staff. There is risk with conducting operational planning within the Beltway. Organizations protecting their individual resource rice bowls and bureaucratic struggles during policy development can extend into operational planning.⁶⁵ This was all too often the case for military planning prior to Goldwater-Nichols Act.⁶⁶

Although the military combatant commands have attempted to integrate the interagency into strategy and plan development and implementation, this reform would extend beyond including the interagency as a part of military plans. This can lead to, or at least the perception, a militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Achieving a coordinated and integrated interagency approach to developing and implementing U.S. grand strategy requires an interagency planning process in which national security planners can be brought together to develop integrated plans to meet national objectives.⁶⁷ Centralized regional planning for the complexity of future contingencies does not mean planning internal to individual departments but requires a whole of government integrated approach building the plan around the complimentary capabilities of each department to ensure the nation's interests and objectives.

Goldwater-Nichols made the regional geographic combatant commands the center for both deliberate and contingency planning including all the military services.⁶⁸ This regional headquarters approach has allowed the military services to plan and train together improving coordination and synergy. This central idea would benefit the interagency toward a regional whole of government approach to national security.

There is a need for a permanent interagency organization with responsibility for all pieces of U.S. foreign policy within a region. This regional interagency organization would improve both the planning and implementation of U.S. grand strategy.⁶⁹ A regional foreign policy strategy that includes the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the other key national security agencies should provide the guide for operations within the region responsibility of the new interagency organization. A career senior executive service national security professional should lead this regional interagency organization complimented with a military four-star deputy; reporting directly to the President through the National Security Council.⁷⁰

A fourth option to improve interagency coordination is to enhance opportunities for interagency education, training, and experience. Training, education, and experience (both exercise and real world) build both trust among professionals and understanding of the capabilities other departments and agencies bring to the national security arena. This is critical for building a strong interdependent interagency team, but requires other reform to ensure an interagency approach to grand strategy development and implementation.

Enhancing the success of the Joint Service Officer program, the crafters of the Beyond Goldwater recommended that Congress work with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to create an incentive structure to encourage national security professionals throughout the United States Government to obtain interagency expertise and experience.⁷¹ Senior national security professionals throughout the interagency should be required to meet certain qualifications prior to assignment to senior level positions within the national security system.

In order for national security professionals to achieve greater understanding and coordination within the interagency, the Office of Personnel Management, with congressional oversight, must establish additional criteria for appointment to career senior executive service in a national security agency.⁷² They should require a 2-3 year assignment within another national security agency prior to appointment.⁷³

Other national security professionals who obtain both interagency education and assignment within other national security agencies should achieve promotion rates at or above the promotion rates of single agency career paths.

This option would resemble the Joint Service Officer and Qualification System mandated in the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Congress believed that implementation of this act would promote more unified direction and action of the U.S. armed forces by promoting jointness among the Military Services.⁷⁴ It is time for a National Security Professional Qualification System.

In September 2010, Representative Ike Skelton introduced legislation in to create a system for interagency education, training, and experience similar to the Joint Qualification System for the Department of Defense in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.⁷⁵ This new bill stated that the modern national security challenges are complex and dynamic and require integration of the full spectrum of capabilities and power of the United States.⁷⁶

The senior service colleges in the Department of Defense provide both education and exercises on the interagency process. The National Security Policy Program, a special program at the United States Army War College, provides select professionals with both education and internship opportunities with other national security agencies.

This enhances the individual officer's perspective and understanding as well as the agency that provides them the opportunity for internship. It would be beneficial for more national security professionals to receive a similar education and internship opportunities.

The Department of Defense programs provide opportunities for a limited number of national security professionals. To greater facilitate interagency education, a National Security Professional's University and training center needs established. This will require both time and resources. Coordination between the Department of Defense Senior Service Colleges and the State Department's National Foreign Affairs Training Center could establish the initial curricula.⁷⁷ This would provide U.S. national security professionals from all departments and agencies a common educational foundation to develop common approaches to national security challenges while bringing their agency perspectives to both the education and process.⁷⁸ The opportunity for training, education, and experience should include intergovernmental agencies, state and local, and possibly staffed with personnel from non-governmental organizations. This will create a unified team of national security professionals.

The interagency requires training, education, and opportunities for experience throughout their careers. After the establishment of a senior level university, these educational opportunities should expand to include an intermediate course similar to the Army Command and General Staff College.

In addition, Congress must allocate and apportion resources to support a U.S. grand strategy. For any policy, strategy, or plan to be successful, priorities and resources must be provided to support its accomplishment. Individual departmental and

agency budgets, without some level of consolidation to meet national objectives, rely on cooperation and benevolence of each organization leading to inefficiency in achieving national objectives.

The nation must establish its strategy and implementation plan and support it with the resourcing decisions to ensure its success. This will require a change in the budget process of the nation and the departments. Even with the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Execution system (PPBE), it is a difficult task for the military services and the Defense Department to program and budget for a comprehensive strategy, leading to many budgeting decisions dominated by factors other than strategy and planning.⁷⁹ The national security apparatus requires a similar system for planning, programming, budgeting, and execution to ensure a coordinated and resourced strategy.

The Hart-Rudman Report states, “Each national security department and agency currently prepares its own budget. No effort is made to define an overall national security budget or to show how the allocation of resources in the individual budgets serves the nation’s overall national security goals.”⁸⁰ It further argues that the overall strategic goals and priorities should also guide the allocation of national security resources and recommends that the Presidential Budget include a national security budget that supports the “critical goals” that emerge from the NSC strategic planning process in addition to individual national security departments and agencies.⁸¹ This is critical to the development and implementation of a grand strategy for the United States. Congress retains its oversight role by appropriating the funds to support the national security objectives.

Recommending interagency reform to improve policy, strategy, and planning is not enough. There are many studies and recommendations to improve interagency coordination, but without the necessary programs, supported by adequate resources they are destined to fail.⁸² It is critical that policy and grand strategy development are connected to both resource allocation and execution.⁸³

Conclusion

The United States Government requires major institutional reforms to the current national security system to ensure a synergistic whole of government approach to meeting the challenges of the emerging domestic and international environment in support of national objectives and interests. The United States must improve both its effectiveness and efficiency in prepare for future challenges and opportunities. Although there is coordination between departments and agencies within the Executive Branch, it is based primarily on their cooperation and is prone to the personalities of the leadership at the time.

There is need for legislation, similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, to provide the impetus and oversight for reform within the interagency. The challenges and opportunities of the future will necessitate a national whole of government approach, extending the concept of “jointness” beyond the military services to include the interagency.⁸⁴ Legislation provides the momentum to ensure continual forward progress between presidential administrations. The Executive Branch is engaged in day-to-day execution and crisis action policy development to focus on major reforms to improve the current system. Ultimately, there is no policy area more critical to the future of the United States than national security.⁸⁵ It is crucial to the security of the United States that a grand strategic approach serves as the foundation for interagency coordination.

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